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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kurtis Thomas Kelly appeals from his judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 
verdict finding him guilty of battery on an officer. On appeal, he asserts that the district 
court erred by failing to grant his motion to dismiss and his motion for a directed verdict, 
and by otherwise erroneously instructing the jury. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
At about 1 :30 a.m. on October 13, 2013, Officer Gus Wessel of the Coeur 
d'Alene Police was dispatched to the Splash bar to respond to a fight. (Tr., p.37, Ls.8-
25.) As the officer arrived at the bar, he observed a large crowd of people and a 
shoeless, shirtless man sitting on the curb in handcuffs. (Tr., p.41, Ls.4-15.) The officer 
recognized the man as Kelly. (Tr., p.42, Ls.15-19.) Kelly was visibly intoxicated. (Tr., 
p.43, Ls.13-21.) Officer Wessel interviewed the bouncers and others and, assessing 
the situation, determined that Kelly had too much to drink and needed to go home. (Tr., 
p.45, Ls.1-10.) A friend of Kelly's, who was sober, offered to give him a ride home and 
officers at the scene attempted to help facilitate that. (Tr., p.45, Ls.11-15.) 
Officer Wessel had Kelly's handcuffs removed. (Tr., p.41, L.18 - p.42, L.14.) 
Kelly's wife helped him put back on his shirt and shoes. (Tr., p.45, Ls.16-23.) At the 
request of Kelly's wife and friend, Officer Wessel and one of his fellow officers physically 
assisted Kelly to the friend's car. (Tr., p.46, L.23 - p.47, L.19.) As they tried to assist 
him, Kelly complained that his arm was hurting, wailed and cried, and said that he did 
not want to go to jail. (Tr., p.48, L.10 - p.49, L.4.) With some difficulty, officers almost 
coaxed Kelly into his friend's car, but then he abruptly stood up, growled, and punched 
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Officer Wessel in the face. (Tr., p.50, L.3 - p.52, L.10.) Kelly's strike drew blood and 
gave Officer Wessel a fat lip. (Tr., p.53, Ls.17-22.) The officers immediately took Kelly 
to the ground and placed him under arrest. (Tr., p.55, Ls.4-16.) 
The state charged Kelly with battery on a police officer. (R., pp.43-44.) Kelly 
exercised his right to trial by jury. (R., pp.127-37, 142-43; see also Tr., pp.28-131.) 
Following that trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. (R., p.144; Tr., p.128, Ls.7-24.) 
The district court entered judgment against Kelly and imposed a unified sentence of 
three years with one and a half years fixed, suspended that sentence, and placed him 
on probation for a period of two years. (R., pp.189-92.) Kelly filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R., pp.194-97.) 
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ISSUE 
Kelly's statement of the issues is set forth at page 7 of his brief and is lengthy. 
Most of the issues may be consolidated into the question of whether Idaho Code § 18-
915(3), which criminalizes batteries committed against police officers, requires the state 
to allege and prove which specific duties the officer was performing when battered. The 
state therefore rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Kelly failed to show that the state is required to allege and prove the specific 
duties that a police officer was performing when he was battered in order to sustain a 
conviction under Idaho Code§ 18-915(3)? 
2. Should this Court decline to consider Kelly's claim that Idaho Code § 18-915(3) is 
unconstitutionally vague because Kelly specifically withdrew his vagueness challenge 
below? In the alternative, has Kelly failed to show that Idaho Code § 18-915(3) is 
unconstitutional? 




Kelly Has Failed To Show That The State Must Prove Which Specific Duty The Officer 
Was Engaged In When The Defendant Battered Him To Sustain A Conviction Under 
Idaho Code§ 18-915(3) 
A. Introduction 
Kelly has raised several challenges to his prosecution for battery on a police 
officer-that the state's charge was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on 
the court, that the state had failed to prove its case against him and he was entitled to 
acquittal, that the jury instructions were deficient, etc.-all based on his argument that 
Idaho Code§ 18-915(3) requires the state to show specifically what duty the officer was 
engaged in when he was battered by the defendant. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-24.) All of 
these arguments fail because there is no such requirement under the statute. 
8. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 
798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
C. Idaho Code § 18-915(3) Does Not Require The State To Allege Which Specific 
Duties The Officer Was Engaged In When Battered By The Defendant 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. State 
v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010). Because "the best guide to 
legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a statute must begin 
with the literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 
732 (2009). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it 
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but simply follows the law as written. McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 
Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). 
Idaho Code § 18-915(3), which criminalizes battery upon a police officer, is 
unambiguous and provides: 
For committing a violation of the provisions of section 18-903, Idaho 
Code, except unlawful touching as described in section 18-903(b), Idaho 
Code, against the person of a former or present peace officer, sheriff or 
police officer: 
(a) Because of the exercise of official duty or because of the 
victim's former or present official status; or 
(b) While the victim is engaged in the performance of his 
duties and the person committing the offense knows or 
reasonably should know that such victim is a peace officer, 
sheriff or police officer; 
the offense shall be a felony punishable by imprisonment in a correctional 
facility for a period of not more than five (5) years, and said sentence shall 
be served consecutively to any sentence being currently served. 
Under a plain reading of the statute, the state must show in some circumstances that 
the police officer was "engaged in the performance of his duties" when he was battered; 
it never requires the state to show any specific duties. 
This is further demonstrated by relevant jury instructions for battery upon a police 
officer, which require the state to prove the following elements of the crime: 
1. On or about a certain date, 
2. in the State of Idaho, 
3. the named defendant committed a battery 
4. upon the named victim, 
5. by engaging in the conduct alleged in the charging document; and 
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6. at the time of the offense the victim was a former or present police officer; and 
7. the defendant either committed the offense because of the police officer's 
exercise of official duties, or the offense was committed while the officer was performing 
his duties; and 
8. the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a 
police officer. 
See l.C.J.I. 12121. The pattern jury instructions do not require the state to prove which 
specific duties the officer was performing when battered by the defendant. It is well 
settled that the pattern jury instructions are presumptively correct. McKay v. State, 148 
Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225 P.3d 700, 704 n.2 (2010) (citations omitted). Kelly has not 
rebutted that presumption. 
Finally, under the plain language of the statute, it is not always required that the 
state prove the officer or former officer was engaged in any duties, specific or otherwise, 
when battered by the defendant. Under the previous version of the statute, the Court of 
Appeals recognized that evidence that the victim was an officer or former officer, and 
that the defendant committed the battery because of that official status, was sufficient to 
uphold a conviction. State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, 28-29, 266 P.3d 499, 503-04 (Ct. 
App. 2011 ). Though the statute was amended in 2011, the amendment did not remove 
that means of committing this crime. Compare I.C. § 18-915(d) (2009) with I.C. § 18-
915(3) (2011 ). The state charged Kelly in the alternative with battery on an officer 
under the theory that Kelly struck Officer Wessel because of his official status. (R., 
pp.43-44.) And Kelly conceded below that he could have violated that statute by 
striking Officer Wessel because of his official status, without any consideration of 
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whether the officer was performing official duties at the time. (Tr., p.21, Ls.20-23.) 
Kelly's argument that the state must prove specific duties is wholly unsupported. 
Because the state is not required to show which specific duty the officer was 
engaged in when he was battered by the defendant, the state did not fail to include an 
element of the crime and its information was therefore sufficient to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction on the district court and comply with due process. See State v. Rogers, 140 
Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1133 (2004) ("The information, indictment, or complaint 
alleging an offense was committed within the state of Idaho confers subject matter 
jurisdiction upon the court."). Because the state was not required to prove what specific 
duty the officer was performing when Kelly battered him, Kelly was not entitled to a 
directed verdict of acquittal. And because there is no requirement to specify which duty 
a battered officer was engaged in when the crime occurred, the jury instructions were 
sufficient. Kelly's conviction for battery on a police officer is supported by the statute 
and should be affirmed. 
11. 
This Court Should Decline To Consider Kelly's Claim That Idaho Code§ 18-915(3) Is 
Unconstitutionally Vague Because He Withdrew His Vagueness Challenge Below 
A. Introduction 
Allowing that Idaho Code § 18-915(3) does not require the state to prove which 
specific duties the officer was engaged in when he was battered by the defendant, Kelly 
appears to contend that the statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp.15-22.) This Court must decline to consider the merits of Kelly's 
argument because he failed to preserve it for appeal. Even had Kelly preserved this 
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issue, his claim would still fail on its merits because, contrary to his arguments, Idaho 
Code § 18-915(3) is in fact constitutional. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, subject to de nova review. 
State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001 ). 
C. Kelly failed to preserve this claim for appellate review 
As a preliminary matter, Kelly specifically withdrew his challenge to the 
constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-915(3) below and so it should not be considered on 
appeal. At the hearing on his motions to dismiss, Kelly clarified that he was raising a 
vagueness challenge, as-applied to police officers, claiming that police officers have no 
duties in Idaho. (Tr., p.14, Ls.8-15.) At the end of the hearing, Kelly withdrew his 
"motion to dismiss on the basis of the vagueness as-applied challenge," keeping only 
his argument that the state was required to allege which specific duties the officer was 
performing when battered. (Tr., p.22, L.8 - p.23, L.9.) This Court "will not review a trial 
court's alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which 
forms the basis for an assignment of error."' State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 
P.2d 290, 296 (1999) (internal quotation omitted). Kelly cannot now raise this argument 
on appeal when he withdrew it below. 
D. Idaho Code§ 18-915(3) Is Not Vague 
Even if Kelly had preserved this issue for consideration on appeal, his challenge 
would still fail on its merits. A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on 
its face or as applied to a defendant's conduct. To succeed on an "as applied" 
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vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that the statute, as applied to his 
conduct, (1) fails to provide fair notice that his conduct was proscribed, or (2) fails to 
provide sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement. State v. Korsen, 138 
Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003); Williams v. State, 153 Idaho 380, 390, 283 
P.3d 127, 137 (Ct. App. 2012). "It has long been held that a statute should not be held 
void for uncertainty if any practical interpretation can be given the statute." State v. 
Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001 ). Finally, when a statute is 
challenged as unconstitutional, the burden of showing that it is unconstitutional rests 
with the challenger, and there is a strong presumption in favor of validity. State v. 
Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 169, 125 P.3d 522, 525 (2005). Kelly has failed to overcome 
this presumption. 
Idaho Code § 18-915(3) as-applied to Kelly and his actions is anything but 
vague. The statute criminalizes batteries of force or violence on police officers because 
of the officers' official status and/or because of the victim's performance of his duties. 
I.C. § 18-915(3). Kelly was charged with battery on a police officer because he struck 
Officer Wessel with a balled fist when he knew, or reasonably should have known, that 
Officer Wessel was a police officer, and/or when Officer Wessel was engaged in the 
performance of his duties. (R., pp.43-44.) The evidence showed that Kelly struck 
Officer Wessel in the face with his fist. (Tr., p.51, Ls.3-6; State's Ex. 3.) And it showed 
that Kelly knew or reasonably should have known that Officer Wessel was a police 
officer: Kelly had interacted with Officer Wessel before. (Tr., p.43, Ls.1-3.) Officer 
Wessel arrived at the scene in uniform, driving a marked police car with activated 
overhead lights. (Tr., p.38, L.12 - p.39, L.15.) When Officer Wessel appeared at the 
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scene, Kelly asked, "Are you my arresting officer?" (State's Ex. 3.) Later, as the 
officers tried to help him, Kelly complained that he did not want to be arrested. (Tr., 
p.48, L.25 - p.49, L.2.) Additionally, Officer Wessel was performing his duties as a 
police officer when Kelly intentionally struck him. (See State's Ex. 3.) The statute 
would put any reasonable person on notice that Kelly's actions were criminal. 
On appeal, Kelly also argues that the statute is vague because, he claims, 
neither it nor any other statute define the duties of police officers; in fact, he argues that 
Coeur d'Alene police officers have no official duties. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-22.) 
Kelly's argument is simply untenable. First, contrary to Kelly's assertions, the duties of 
police officers are set forth by statute. Under Idaho Code § 19-5101 (c), the definition of 
"law enforcement" includes the police. Under subsection (d) (emphasis added), "peace 
officer" is defined as "any employee of a police or law enforcement agency which is a 
part of or administered by the state or any political subdivision thereof." And the duties 
of such officers are set forth in that subsection as "primarily consist[ing] of the 
prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of penal, traffic or highway laws 
of this state or any political subdivision." Finally, under subsection (e), "political 
subdivision" is defined to include cities. Thus, under Idaho Code § 19-5101, police 
officers in the city of Coeur d'Alene have duties which "primarily consist of the 
prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of penal, traffic or highway 
laws." These duties apply in this case where Officer Wessel was dispatched to 
investigate a possible violation of penal laws. 
Second, Idaho appellate courts have also defined the duties of police officers. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that police officers have a community 
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caretaking function, which "arises from the duty of police officers to help citizens in need 
of assistance." State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004) (citing 
State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997)). This duty to assist 
also applies to this case where Kelly, visibly intoxicated, was in need of assistance. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals has analogized the "many and varied" duties of police 
officers to those of sheriffs. See State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 179, 755 P.2d 471, 
4 76 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its precedents. The rule of stare decisis 
dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it 
has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to 
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. 
Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002). While Kelly expresses disagreement 
with the Court of Appeals' opinion in Wilkerson (Appellant's brief, p.20), he has failed to 
show that it was unjust, unwise, or manifestly wrong. Furthermore, Kelly fails to even 
acknowledge, much less address, the Idaho Supreme Court's binding precedent in 
either Page or Wixom. 
Finally, Kelly contends that "this Court may wish that ... the Idaho Legislature 
had simply adopted [a] statute defining duty within the context of I.C. § 18-915 similar to 
the English common law.... But it did not." (Appellant's brief, pp.21-22.) In fact, it did. 
As provided in Idaho Code§ 73-116: 
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or 
inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases 
not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts 
of this state. 
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Because, as Kelly concedes, the common law defines duties for the police, even if 
those duties had not been specifically provided for by statute, they would be adopted by 
Idaho Code§ 73-116. Kelly's argument fails. 
Each of Kelly's attacks on the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-915(3) are 
wholly without merit. Idaho Code§ 18-915(3) is constitutional. Kelly's conviction under 
that statute should be affirmed. 
111. 
Kelly Has Failed To Show That The District Court Committed Instructional Error 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Kelly claims that the district court erroneously instructed the jury by 
(1) not instructing the jury as to which specific duty the officer was engaged in when he 
was battered by Kelly; (2) rejecting Kelly's instruction on voluntary intoxication; (3) 
rejecting his self-defense instruction; and (4) rejecting his lesser-included offense 
instruction. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-34.) All of Kelly's arguments fail. First, as shown 
above, Idaho Code§ 18-915(3) does not require the state to prove which particular duty 
an officer was engaged in when he was battered by a defendant. Second, the district 
court correctly rejected Kelly's instruction on voluntary intoxication because it was 
directly contrary to Idaho Code § 18-116. Third, Kelly failed to present a prima facie 
case entitling him to a self-defense instruction. Fourth, even if the facts of Kelly's case 
supported the giving of a lesser-included offense instruction, the failure to give that 
instruction would be harmless in this case. The district court should be affirmed. 
12 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 
(2000)). "An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the 
instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v. Shackelford, 150 
Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010). 
C. Idaho Code § 18-915(3) Does Not Require The State To Prove Which Particular 
Duty An Officer Was Engaged In When He Was Battered By The Defendant 
A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous statement of 
the law, is not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible comment on the 
evidence, or is adequately covered by other instructions. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 
873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987). Below, Kelly objected to the elements 
instructions, arguing that the state was required to prove which specific duty the officer 
was engaged in when Kelly battered him. (Supp. Tr., p.4, L.10 - p.5, L.18.) This is an 
incorrect statement of the law. As shown above, there is no requirement under Idaho 
Code§ 18-915(3) for the state to show specifically which duty an officer was engaged in 
when battered by a defendant. (See Argument I.) The district court's elements 
instruction followed both the language of the statute and the relevant pattern instruction, 
I.C.J.I. 12121, and so was presumptively correct. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 
n.2, 225 P.3d 700, 704 n.2 (2010) (citations omitted). Because the district court would 
have misstated the law by altering the instruction to conform to Kelly's idiosyncratic view 
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of Idaho Code § 18-915(3), the district court was correct to give its instructions and 
should be affirmed. 
D. Kelly Has Failed To Show That The Trial Court Erred By Refusing His Requested 
Intoxication Instruction 
Below, Kelly requested that the district court instruct the jury that voluntary 
intoxication could be raised as a defense that affected the defendant's mental state. 
(Supp. Tr., p.10, Ls.12-22.) The district court declined the instruction, finding that it was 
contrary to Idaho Code § 18-116, which states: 
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible 
for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any 
offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the 
existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense unless the 
defendant proves that he did not know that it was an intoxicating 
substance when he consumed, smoked, sniffed, injected or otherwise 
ingested the substance causing the condition. 
Again, because giving Kelly's preferred instruction on voluntary intoxication would have 
been an erroneous statement of the law, the district court properly refused that 
instruction. See Johns, 112 Idaho at 881, 736 P.2d at 1335. 
On appeal, Kelly asserts that Idaho Code § 18-116 is unconstitutional because it 
"violates reality, reduces the burden placed on the state to prove specific intent crimes, 
and prevents a defendant from providing a legitimate defense." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.24-30.) Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, subject to de nova 
review. State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001). 
The Court of Appeals has already determined that Idaho Code § 18-116 is 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Ransom, 137 Idaho 560, 564-
65, 50 P.3d 1055, 1059-60 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 
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(1996)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Porter, 142 Idaho 371, 128 P.3d 908 
(2005). Implicitly recognizing that the statute is constitutional under the United States 
Constitution, Kelly asserts that the statute is nevertheless unconstitutional under Article 
I, section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution. (Appellant's brief, pp.28-30.) He claims 
that the statute operates to shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the 
defendant. The statute does no such thing. Idaho Code§ 18-116 forecloses a defense; 
it does not shift evidentiary burdens. 
Kelly appears to recognize this. He therefore asserts that, under the Idaho 
Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709 (2012), Idaho 
Code§ 18-116 "should be read to indicated that while ... voluntary intoxication cannot 
support an affirmative defense to overcome general intent," it may be relevant in 
considering specific intent. (Appellant's brief, pp.28-29.) Whatever the merits of Kelly's 
argument, it is wholly irrelevant to this case. Kelly was charged with and convicted of 
battery on a police officer in violation of Idaho Code § 18-915(3). (R., pp.43-44, 144.) 
To be guilty of violating this statute, the defendant must commit a battery on a police 
officer under either Idaho Code § 18-903(a) or (c). The specific type of battery alleged 
by the state was the willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of the 
police officer. (R., p.43.) This is battery as defined in Idaho Code§ 18-903(a). The 
Court has previously held that this type of battery constitutes a general intent crime. 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 400, 3 P.3d 67, 78 (Ct. App. 2000). And Kelly 
concedes that "voluntary intoxication cannot support an affirmative defense to overcome 
general intent." 
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To be guilty of this crime, Kelly only had to intend to strike the officer because he 
was an officer or while he was performing his duties as an officer. The state put on 
evidence during trial which proved that Kelly had this intent. (See Tr., p.38, L.12 - p.39, 
L.15; p.43, Ls.1-3; p.48, L.25 - p.49, L.2; p.51, Ls.3-6; see also State's Ex. 3.) No 
burden was shifted to Kelly. As noted above, the burden of showing that a statute is 
unconstitutional rests with the challenger, and there is a strong presumption in favor of 
validity. State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 169, 125 P.3d 522, 525 (2005). Kelly's 
conclusory allegations and colorful arguments do nothing to rebut this presumption. 
Because Kelly has failed to show that Idaho Code § 18-116 is unconstitutional, he has 
failed to show that the trial court erred by refusing his requested intoxication instruction 
which, on its face, was contrary to that statute. 
E. Kelly Failed To Present A Prima Facie Case Entitling Hirn To A Self-Defense 
Instruction 
On appeal, Kelly argues that the district court erred by refusing to give his 
requested self-defense instruction. (Appellant's brief, pp.31-32.) A trial court may 
properly refuse a requested instruction which is not supported by the evidence. Johns, 
112 Idaho at 881, 736 P.2d at 1335. To be entitled to an instruction on an affirmative 
defense, a defendant must "present facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case 
relevant to [the] defense." State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 
(Ct. App. 2000). Whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports an instruction is a 
matter within the trial court's discretion. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 
1249, 1259 (1997). 
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Kelly did not meet his burden of establishing that a self-defense instruction was 
supported by the evidence. To be entitled to a self-defense instruction, Kelly had to 
demonstrate from the record "evidence of reasonable fear of some level of bodily harm," 
State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 329, 986 P.2d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 1999), and that the 
battery he committed was a reasonable response to the level of threat posed by the 
victim, State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 669-70, 726 P.2d 772, 781-82 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Reviewing the record, there is no evidence that the officer posed any threat to Kelly, 
much less evidence of reasonable fear of bodily harm. 
Kelly implicitly recognizes that he failed to show a prima facie case entitling him 
to a self-defense instruction, arguing instead that if Idaho Code § 18-116 constitutionally 
relieves the state of establishing a defendant's mens rea, then the defense should also 
be allowed to substitute whatever mens rea it pleases to show an affirmative defense. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.30-32.) Kelly thus continues to misunderstand the operation of 
Idaho Code § 18-116. It does not relieve the state of proving the elements of a crime. It 
only forecloses the defendant from attempting to use his voluntary intoxication as an 
affirmative defense to his criminal act. Kelly's argument is without merit. 
F. Even If The Facts Of This Case Supported Giving Kelly's Included Offense 
Instruction, Failure To Do So Would Still Be Harmless 
Finally, Kelly asserts that the district court erred by refusing his lesser-included 
offense instruction. (Appellant's brief, pp.32-34.) Below, Kelly argued that Idaho Code 
§ 18-915(1), which he termed "battery on certain personnel," was a lesser included 
offense of Idaho Code § 18-915(3), battery on a police officer. (Supp. Tr., p.17, L.21 -
p.19, L.11.) Even assuming, arguendo, that Kelly was entitled to a lesser-included 
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offense instruction, the failure to give one would necessarily constitute harmless error in 
this case because Kelly was convicted of the greater offense. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 
7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013). When a court instructs a jury on a lesser-included 
offense, it also gives an acquittal first instruction. & (citation omitted.) Idaho appellate 
courts "presume that a jury follows the instructions it is given." & Because it must be 
presumed that the jury would follow the acquittal first instruction, it naturally follows that, 
when the defendant is convicted of the greater crime, the jury would have never 
reached the lesser-included offense. & Any error in failing to instruct the jury on 
Kelly's proposed lesser-included offense, even if he was entitled to the instruction, 
would therefore be harmless. 
Kelly has failed to show instructional error by the district court. Kelly's conviction 
for battery on a police officer should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Kelly's conviction for battery 
on an officer. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2015. 
~ER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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